Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". The Court has abandoned settled law to decide this case. Cf. We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Cf. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. several smaller, dispersed facilities? In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. of Cal. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candidates. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like "minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf. But even recast as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Gomillion does not assist the majority, for its focus was on the alleged effect of the city's action, which was to exclude black voters from the municipality of Tuskegee. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. See, e. g., Feeney, supra, at 272; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Gomillion's holding "is compelled by the Equal Protection Clause"). . Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. See ante, at 642-643. App. given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 Id., at 313. I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. See App. of Oral Arg. Yet, under the State's plan, they still constitute a voting majority in 10 (or 83%) of the 12 congressional districts. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Not so, apparently, when the districting "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines.7 In that case, we are told, such proof no longer is needed. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. 634 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). The essence of the majority's argument is that UJO dealt with a claim of vote dilution-which required a specific showing of harm-and that cases such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), dealt with claims of racial segregation-which did not. Constitutional Principle. no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group's voting strength. to Juris. Location North Carolina General Assembly. See Appendix, infra. Fast Facts: Shaw v. Reno Case Argued: April 20, 1993 Decision Issued: June 28, 1993 Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose V s. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. Supp., at 468-469. The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly was entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and redrew its congressional districts to account for the changes in population. The distinction is without foundation. Pp. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. When a newly created district cannot be explained by means other than race, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." Cf. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. of Oral Arg. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Shaw appealed. But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" 1237, 1258 (1993). 364 U. S., at 341. ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. Traditional civil rights groups--the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund--submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of the minority districts, and groups with long histories of opposition to quota programs--Washington Legal Foundation and the American Jewish Congress--argued against them. Such approval would be forthcoming only if the plan did not jeopardize minority representation. Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case "functionally indistinguishable" from multimember districting and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as "other varieties of gerrymandering." It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). The Court expressly declined to reach that question. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. Proc. JUSTICE SOUTER does not adequately explain why these harms are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Media. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller nearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." They did not even claim to be white. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. 653-657. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for. Yes; the Court agreed that the shape of the proposed district was so odd that there was no compelling explanation for its shape other than separating voters by race. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." In particular, they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution. It is shortsighted as well, for a regularly shaped district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped one.9 By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority "immediately casts attention in the wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political realities of district composition." these are all arguments for ( ) side. It also will be true where the minority population is not scattered but, for reasons unrelated to racefor example incumbency protection-the State would rather not create the majority-minority district in its most "obvious" location.10 When, as is the case here, the creation of. At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. Id., at 154-155. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Because the State's purpose here was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and because the General Assembly's plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters state-. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. T. HOMAS. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. No. The State has made no mystery of its intent, which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections, see Brief for State Appellees 13-14, by improving the minority group's prospects of electing a candidate of its choice. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. With him on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons. Shaw. ham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. Id., at 342-348. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. (referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications" 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'" (quoting Regents of Univ. Bolling, The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I. 633, 637 (1983). Majority Opinion/Decision. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. In the Attorney General's view, the General Assembly could have created a second majorityminority district "to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area" by using boundary lines "no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan," but failed to do so for "pretextual reasons." "As long as members of racial groups have [a] commonality of interest" and "racial bloc voting takes place," he argues, "legislators will have to take race into account" in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. Meanwhile, in other districting cases, specific consequential harm will still need to be pleaded and proven, in the absence of which the use of race may be invalidated only if it is shown to serve no legitimate state purpose. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. What was argued? 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). UJO, supra, at 151-152. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. [W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) As for this latter category, we. Shaw's group claimed that drawing districts based on race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Id., at 477. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. 808 F. As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. Ibid. Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted).
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